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Suppose you had unexpectedly 
received some money, for instance a gift or 
a lottery prize. What would you like to do 
with the money? Why the action you chose 
to do is of much importance to you? What 
would you like to achieve by that action? 
This is a simple illustration of the generic 
level of consumer decision making, 
henceforth the generic level. It is important 
to note that neither money nor unexpec-
tedness defines the generic level. Although 
there are plenty of examples of receiving a 
windfall, gifts and lottery prizes being two 
of them, the generic level also concerns 
situations when expectations rule. For 
example, people may expect to receive a 
bumper bonus, an extra profit, a tax 
return, gain excessive money from a pre-
vious budget, or even to inherit some 
valuable assets from their beloved parents. 
To a certain degree, people in such 
situations must ponder of the different 
ways to utilize the money. The defining 
features of the generic level concern the 
mental processes of decision making in 
which an individual is trying to allocate a 
consumer resource into different cate-
gories of activities (Van Veldhoven & 
Groenland, 1993).  
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Consumer resources also concern 
time. The generic level of decision making 
also takes place when one is having a free 
time, either expectedly or unexpectedly. 
Examples include situations such as being 
stranded at a strange place due to travel 
chaos, cancellation of a planned appoint-
ment, or free time due to earlier 
accomplishment of a job. One is likely to 
think over alternative ways of using the 
time, such as reading a book, window 
shopping, listening to favourite music, 
working with a notebook, or having a chat 
over the internet. A particularly common 
situation is retirement, both voluntary and 
involuntary retirement due to work lay off 
(Van Solinge, 2006). One may opt an 
extended summer holiday, learn a new 
skill, or take on a new life project such as 
writing a book. Such choices can be 
characterized in terms of utilitarian and 
hedonic or experiential values (e.g., Dhar 
& Wertenbroch, 2000).  
It may sound strange, but having 
social power appears to incite problems of 
sorts, in the generic level. A newly 
installed politician at a public office knows 
this well as he or she must decide on 
different ways of using public assets. 
Being the leader of a peer group, be it at a 
kindergarten or a university student club, 
confronts one with similar kinds of 
problems. Parents certainly have constant 
problems allocating time for different sorts 
of children activities; whether more tennis 
or music, play time, or taking extra 
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lessons. A particular interest of the generic 
level concerns the immediate versus long-
term consequences of the alternative 
activities. 
Life transitions often force people to 
make some generic level decisions. Take 
divorce as an example. Direct conse-
quences of a divorce settlement may 
include changes in the amount of income, 
place of residence, social identity, and 
daily chores (Poortman, 2002). A divorce 
settlement often requires the divorcee to 
redefine life, such as whether to get 
married again or whether to venture a 
work or career (Hetherington & Kelly, 
2002), and decide what lifestyle or 
standard of living are acceptable, and even 
friendship and personal network to 
maintain (Terhell, 2003). Decision making 
at a life transition represents a strategic 
type of the generic level of consumer 
decision making. It involves choices 
between different types of life themes and 
values (e.g., Huffman, Ratneshwar & 
Mick, 2000). 
The aforementioned situations occur 
at the individual level. But, life transition 
may occur at a mass-scale, such as in the 
aftermath of a major natural disaster. 
Large scale disasters, such as the 26th 
December 2004 tsunami, left the survivors 
unwillingly to redefine their life. Imagine 
the thoughts emerging within one who 
had just lost his wife, children and most of 
his family members, house and almost 
everything he/she had ever owned, as well 
as the place and tools to work. A man who 
I happened to encounter in Aceh, Indo-
nesia, 11 days after the tsunami simply 
stated, “I don’t know what I am going to 
do with my life.” This expresses a sense of 
loss for one’s life goals, experienced by 
many of the survivors, synonymous to a 
loss in one’s meaning of life (Carballo, 
Heal & Horbaty, 2006) at a mass scale. 
Goals at the most general level can be 
equated to a generic goal. It concerns 
major categories of desired end states of 
one’s life, and may thus constitute the 
meaning of life itself. 
In short, the generic level concerns all 
types of consumer resources, namely 
money, effort, social power, and time, 
including the live-time of the consumer 
itself. It occurs at the individual as well as 
at the societal levels. The mental processes 
are articulated when an individual is 
deliberating choices of activities related to 
a resource. The objective of the decision 
making is to optimize the utility or benefit 
for the short- and long-term interests of 
the consumer. The higher the value of the 
resources concerned, the higher the 
involvement in the processes of decision 
making. At a certain level, these processes 
may require one to look inward deeply, to 
search one’s soul, to examine faiths and 
fundamental values, and to contemplate 
what life means to the consumer.  
How the generic level relates to other aspects of 
consumer behaviour? 
A generic level of consumer behaviour 
can be distinguished from the other levels 
of consumer decision-making, namely 
specific allocation and modal allocation 
levels of consumer behaviour (Antonides 
& Van Raaij, 1998; Van Veldhoven & 
Groenland, 1993). The specific allocation 
level of consumer behaviour concerns 
problems of choice between brands and 
brand types of a product or service. The 
modal allocation level takes place when 
decisions within the product domain are 
concerned. For example, consumers may 
consider whether to save a windfall 
income in a certificate of deposit or to 
invest in a venture capital. At the generic 
allocation level, decisions between major 
categories of budgets, namely saving and 
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spending, are the primary concerns for the 
consumer.  
The specific, modal, and generic level 
all contributes to the welfare of the 
individual. In particular, the generic level 
of consumer decision making has strategic 
consequences. According to Thaler (1985), 
saving and spending represents the most 
important types of economic behaviour of 
individuals and households. Considering 
that decisions regarding saving and 
spending are taken at the generic level, 
many aspects of the consumers’ life are 
highly influenced by the processes of 
decision making at the generic level. For 
example, financial security or vulnerability 
of individual consumers and households 
are likely to be a consequence of past 
decision making processes at the generic 
level. This implies that high quality 
generic level decision making will signifi-
cantly contribute to the well-being of indi-
vidual consumers and households. The 
following are two cases that illustrate the 
strategic importance of the generic level:  
“Michael Carroll won £9.7 million in 
the National Lottery in 2002. 
Immediately he bought four homes, a 
holiday villa in Spain, two convertible 
BMWs, two Mercedes-Benz cars, a 
stake in a beloved football club, spent 
“untold thousands” on alcohol and 
drugs, wears a very large amount of 
gold jewellery. Eighteen months after 
winning the lottery, all of the fortune 
had been spent on this extravagant 
life, and now he is nearly broke” 
(Wikipedia) 
“Brad Duke, 34, pocketed a lump sum 
of $85 million after winning a $220 
million Powerball jackpot in 2005. He 
spent the first month of his new life 
assembling a team of financial advi-
sors. The portfolio he has built: $45 
million in municipal bonds, $35 
million on oil and gas stocks and real 
estate, $18,000 repayment on student 
loan, $125,000 paying off mortgage. 
He also set $1,3 million family 
foundation. He spent $63,000 on a trip 
to Tahiti with 17 friends, $12,000 
annual gift to each of his family 
members, and $14,500 on a hobby car. 
Eighteen months after wining his 
fortune, he is on course of his goal: to 
become a billionaire in 10 years” 
(CNN Money). 
Scientific examination to the lottery 
winning phenomena are reported in Nissle 
and Bschor (2002), and Gardner and 
Oswald (2001). 
Not only is this an important problem, 
the generic level of consumer behaviour is 
also a common problem. For some time 
now, empirical studies have revealed 
individual differences in the propensity to 
save (Wärneryd, 1999). Whereas some 
people routinely put aside a certain 
portion of their income, others fail to do 
so, on a regular basis, and the rest is never 
saving. Even among those who regularly 
save, many are doing so for amounts that 
are too small or in times that are too late. A 
survey shows that when people get older, 
they usually regret their lower savings: 60 
per cent wish they had saved more when 
they were younger (BMRB International, 
1994). In retrospect, older people often 
regretted their late start on pension 
savings (Prudential UK, 1996). As evident 
in the survey, 42% of the respondents 
agreed to the statement: “I wish I had 
considered my pension arrangement 
earlier.” This is at odds with the common 
belief in many cultural settings that saving 
is considered a virtue (Lea, Tarpy, & 
Webley, 1999), as well as the answers of 
most people that they would like to save 
their money (Wärneryd, 1999). However, 
this observation fits with an assertion 
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made by Katona (1975, p. 235), that is, 
“plans to save often represent good 
intentions that are not carried out at a later 
date.” 
Saving is not only a problem at the 
individual or household level. At the 
macroeconomic level, low saving rates 
have become problems in many developed 
countries. For example, the Financial 
Research Survey (1996) reports that 26 per-
cent of the UK labour force has no saving 
or financial investment at all. Of it, 22 and 
21 percent are among those aged 45-54 and 
55-64 years, respectively. Thirty three per 
cent of the former group and 26% of the 
latter have less than £500 in their current 
saving and investment accounts. Further-
more, 40 percent of working adults inade-
quately contribute to their pension. Should 
these current trends continue, it will pay 
out less than 40 per cent of their final 
salary. 
Under-saving represents another side 
of consumer problems, namely over 
spending. It has become both individual 
and societal problems (e.g., Schor, 2000). 
Various explanations have been offered. 
Among others, the urge to conspicuous 
consumption, an explanation offered by 
Thorsten Veblen dated back to the late 19th 
century (Veblen, 1899/2000). Another 
explanation is concerned with the desire to 
keep up with the Jones’s (Duesenberry, 
1949). With the advent of the new era of 
consumerism, mediated by the high 
penetration of television, it causes the up-
scaling of consumer aspirations, spending, 
and norms (e.g., Schor, 2000). 
Both facets of the problem may 
originate at the generic level of consumer 
behaviour. That is, the failure to identify 
goals that include needs and wants at 
present time and in the future, and the 
failure to budget current and future 
income accordingly. Another problem is 
concerned with the failure of self-control 
with regard to prior budget commitment 
(Shefrin & Thaler, 1988). Self-control is 
often discussed outside the area of the 
generic level of consumer behaviour. 
However, there is no point in self-control if 
there is no prior budget commitment, 
which is conceptually determined at the 
generic level. Moreover, self-control may 
increase or decrease with the clarity of 
budget commitment (Baumeister, 
Heatherton, & Tice, 1994). 
Toward this end, studying the generic 
level of consumer behaviour is relevant to 
economic psychology, government policy, 
and everyday practice. For the economic 
psychologist, the study may advance 
knowledge of consumer behaviour. For 
consumers, it is a way to understand their 
behaviour as well as a means to improve 
the direction towards a more goal-directed 
behaviour. To policy makers, it may 
increase the accuracy of welfare policy and 
planning. This is important in the context 
of problems regarding household saving 
in many developed economies. To mar-
keters, it is relevant for marketing pro-
ducts in the strategic domain of consumer 
behaviour. 
Theoretical approaches to generic level  
The generic level of consumer 
behaviour involves saving and spending. 
In terms of behavioural and psychological 
processes, a generic level involves 
decision-making processes along with the 
sub-processes such as information search, 
deliberation, and judgment (Baron, 2000). 
Along the processes, different facets of the 
self of the decision maker are involved. 
Hence, three theoretical approaches are 
relevant to the analysis of the generic level 
of consumer behaviour, namely economic, 
behavioural, and psychological approach-
es. Differences between these approaches 
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have been a subject of discussion (e.g., 
Hogarth & Reder, 1986; Earl, 1990; Lopes, 
1994; Lunt, 1996; Van Raaij, 1999; 
Wärneryd, 1999). Perspectives of each of 
the approaches will be summarized in the 
following three sections. 
Economic approach 
A generic allocation problem is at the 
heart of the economic discipline. It is 
defined as a study regarding how an 
economy or individual chooses to allocate 
scarce resources to different uses and over 
time (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 1992). The 
objective of an economic study is to make 
predictions and to provide recommen-
dations. The fundamental assumption is 
that economic agents (individuals, firms, 
or nations) are rational and act rationally. 
It means they attempt to maximize their 
utilities or profits from they way they 
allocate their resources. Furthermore, 
interactions between rational agents with 
rational expectations create a market that 
enforces agents to behave rationally. 
Market forces will eliminate irrational 
agents through processes of profit taking 
by rational agents. Thus, the theory 
assumes perfect competition on the side of 
the market. These two assumptions are 
obviously very strong and it is unlikely 
that they withstand empirical examina-
tion. Nevertheless, they may serve useful 
analytical objectives (Kirzner, 1997). It 
does not matter whether the assumption 
does not correspond to reality, as long as 
the theory provides useful predictions. 
Friedman (1953) suggests an eloquent 
analogy of economic theory to an expert 
billiard player. In his words:  
“It seems not at all unreasonable that 
excellent predictions would be yielded 
by the hypothesis that the billiard 
player made his shots as if he knew 
the complicated mathematical for-
mulas that would give the optimum 
directions of travel, could estimate 
accurately by eye the angles, etc., …. 
could make lightning calculations 
from the formulas, and could then 
make the balls travel in the direction 
indicated by the formulas.” (p. 21). 
In reality it is obvious that very few 
expert billiard players, if any at all, are 
well versed with mathematics and physics 
to match their expertise. It is not necessary 
to master mathematics and physics in 
order to become an expert billiard player, 
as it is not necessarily true that every 
economic agent is indeed perfectly rational 
and every market is perfectly competitive. 
Rationality and market competition are 
approximations for the way economic 
agents are interacting and market mecha-
nisms are developing. 
The rational behaviour of the econo-
mic agent is the cornerstone of microeco-
nomic theory. A rational agent has stable 
preferences. It means, among others, that 
preferences are relatively stable over time, 
and that emotional and contextual factors 
do not influence preferences. Another 
assumption is that immediate consump-
tion of a resource is preferred to delayed 
consumption or saving. However, it is also 
accepted that the satisfaction an agent 
obtains from consumption at one time is 
dependent on consumption at the pre-
vious time. The law of diminishing 
marginal utility of consumption states that 
the satisfaction one obtains from every 
additional unit is diminishing. The second 
glass of coke is less satisfying than the 
first, and the third is less than the second 
glass. Thus, the law dictates that after 
certain level of consumption is reached, a 
further unit of consumption cannot pro-
vide significant satisfaction. This principle 
can be applied to explain generic alloca-
tion problems of consumer behaviour. 
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Consumer resources will be saved when 
consumption out of it has reached its 
optimum utility. 
The principle may be extended to 
include inter-temporal concerns of con-
sumption. Maximum utility can be 
obtained by distributing consumption of a 
resource over a period of time. A unit of 
consumption gives higher level of 
satisfaction after a certain period of time, 
as compared to the consumption of the 
same unit right after previous consump-
tion. Thus, a rational consumer is assumed 
to weigh the marginal utility derived from 
consumption now to that of the future. 
Saving is a mechanism to smoothen con-
sumption over time, so as to maximize 
utility over the period. Important theories 
in applying this principle are the life-cycle 
theory (Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954; 
Modigliani, 1986) and permanent income 
theory (Friedman, 1957). The gist of these 
theories is illustrated eloquently in Thaler 
(1994): 
“How much should … a person 
consume in a given year? The answer 
is this: in any year, compute the 
present value of financial wealth, 
including current income, net assets, 
and the expected value of future 
income; figure out the level annuity 
that could be purchased with that 
money; then consume the amount that 
would be received from such an 
annuity” (pp. 107-108). 
From this brief overview, it can be 
concluded that economic theories focus on 
prediction and prescription. The theoreti-
cal approach is based on assumption of 
rationality of the economic agent. Al-
though the assumption has been defended 
as acquiring descriptive power, it is more 
appropriately conceived as a normative 
assumption (e.g., Thaler, 1980). A highly 
relevant assumption to the generic allo-
cation level of consumer behaviour is that 
consumption is preferred to saving. Thus, 
saving is what is left over from consump-
tion (Lea, Tarpy, & Webley, 1987). This 
definition signifies the residual nature of 
saving, against which Katona (1975) shows 
other types of saving, namely discretio-
nary and contractual savings. Moreover, 
extensive empirical studies have consis-
tently identified several saving motives, 
namely precautionary, transactional, spe-
culative, retirement, and inter vivo and 
bequest saving motives (Katona, 1975; 
Nyhus, 2002). Within the policy domain, 
the primary saving models (e.g., the life-
cycle model, the precautionary savings 
model, the bequest motive model) have 
not been successful in explaining why so 
many elderly reach retirement with little 
or no savings (Gustman & Juster, 1996; 
Poterba, 1996).  
Behavioural approach 
Alternative approaches to mainstream 
economic theories are offered in the beha-
vioural theories of consumer choice. An 
enriched model was developed by Shefrin 
and Thaler (1988) and was called the 
Behavioural Life Cycle Hypothesis 
(BLCH). The model includes the notion of 
self-control (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981), 
mental accounting (Thaler, 1980, 1985, 
1999), and framing effects (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981, 1986; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984). Contrary to mainstream 
economic theory, behavioural economics 
assumes that self-control is the funda-
mental problem of an economic agent 
(Thaler, 2000; Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, 
1998; Barberis & Thaler, 2003). A strategy 
for overcoming self-control is to adopt 
mental accounting, that is, a set of cogni-
tive operations used by individual con-
sumers and households to organize, eva-
luate, and keep track of financial expend-
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itures (Thaler, 1999). An important mental 
accounting practice in financial behaviour 
is that income and wealth are organized in 
separate mental accounts that implies 
differential marginal propensity to con-
sume different sizes of income, namely 
current income account, current asset 
accounts, and future income account 
(Shefrin & Thaler, 1988). The behavioural 
approach to consumer behaviour assumes 
fundamental problems in terms of 
bounded rationality, bounded willpower, 
and bounded self-control (Mulainathan & 
Thaler, 2000; Thaler, 2000; Jolls, Sunstein, 
& Thaler, 1998). 
In mental accounting, expenditures 
are grouped into categories (housing, food, 
clothing, etc.). Similarly, wealth is assigned 
in one of the three mental accounts, 
namely current income account, current 
asset account, and future income account. 
Expenditures are financed from money 
drawn from corresponding accounts. For 
example, money deducted from current 
income account is for spending on food 
and entertainment, whereas home impro-
vement is financed from current asset 
accounts. Each mental account is asso-
ciated with a different propensity to save 
and to spend. Specifically, the current 
income is almost completely spent whe-
reas future income is not at all consumed. 
The marginal propensity to consume 
(MPC) current assets is in between the 
MPC of current income and the MPC of 
future income. 
Mental accounting also implies that 
money is not fungible. That is, money in a 
mental account is not a perfect substitute 
for money in another mental account 
(Thaler, 1999). Henderson and Peterson 
(1992) offer a cognitive psychological 
interpretation of mental accounting. They 
argue that the framing processes under-
lying mental accounting are the same as 
the processes described in categorization, 
schema, and script theories. Thus they 
suggest the use of existing theories when 
attempting to explain mental accounting 
processes.  
Another important feature of the 
BLCH concerns modelling consumer 
efforts for establishing self-control. The 
model is based on the assumption of two 
competing functions in the consumer, 
namely the planner and the doer (Thaler & 
Shefrin, 1981). The planner is always trying 
to secure long-term interest of the con-
sumer, whilst the doer is pathologically 
myopic. The latter tempts consumers to 
spend income as soon as possible. Exer-
cising control over the power of the doer is 
assumed to require willpower effort, 
which implies negative utility for the 
consumer. Mental accounting is viewed as 
a way for exercising self-control. In addi-
tion, pre-commitment devices such as a 
contractual obligation to save, similar as 
the notion of contractual saving (Katona, 
1975), are viewed as devices to help exer-
cise self-control. 
The BLCH claims to be able to predict 
consumer behaviour regarding pensions 
and saving, and the effect of transitory 
income (Shefrin & Thaler, 1998). In com-
parison to standard economic theory, 
BLCH claims superiority in explaining two 
anomalies regarding consumption. The 
first anomaly concerns the robust obser-
vation that consumption is excessively 
sensitive to income. The second anomaly 
concerns the non-fungibility of various 
forms of wealth (Thaler, 1994), as des-
cribed briefly in the preceding paragraph. 
BLCH commands strong implication for 
policies. For example, changes from the 
procedure of opt-in to opt-out in the 
pension scheme offered to the employees, 
as recommended by BLCH, have increased 
participations in pension plan, a claim 
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having already been substantiated (Thaler 
& Bernartzi, 2004). Subsequently, recom-
mendations based on BLCH have been 
applied to national pension policies in 
several developed countries, such as the 
USA, the UK, and New Zealand (The 
Economist, 2005). 
Although the behavioural approach to 
consumer behaviour adopts more realistic 
assumptions regarding human behaviour, 
the focus of the research remains the same 
as mainstream economics, namely predic-
tion. Contrary to the mainstream theories, 
BLCH reflects the limitations of human 
capacities, particularly with regards to 
problems of self-control, and are thus 
substantially closer to capturing the reality 
in consumer behaviour. Nevertheless, it is 
taken for granted that individuals assign 
their income and wealth into a number of 
budgets. Questions such as how budget 
categories are formed, for what purpose, 
where the purposes come from, and how 
the source of a purpose may affect the 
ability to self-control, are not addressed in 
BLCH. For this, we may say that the 
theory has missed another quality of 
human being, namely the capacity for self-
regulation (Bandura, 2001). Further 
Bandura (2001) argues that the unparallel 
success of human beings in evolutionary 
history did not materialize without the 
capacity for self-regulation of human 
thought and action. It is plausible to 
assume that consumer behaviour is self-
regulated, especially at the generic level 
when a consumer is considering ways of 
utilizing resources at his or her disposal. 
Psychological approach  
Psychological research is concerned 
with describing the behaviour and the 
processes underlying the behaviour. Theo-
ries are developed on the basis of empiri-
cal observations through various experi-
mental and survey methods. The theories 
accommodate several factors, namely 
internal factors (i.e., personality, motiva-
tion, attitude), psychological processes 
(i.e., cognitive and affective processes), 
and external factors (i.e., stimuli, context) 
in the explanation of the behaviour.  
One of major theoretical approach in 
psychology is the social cognitive theory. 
The most complete version of the theory 
was introduced by Bandura (1986). Among 
others, the theory assumes the capacity of 
human agency. It reflects the essence of 
being human as the capacity to exercise 
control over the nature and quality of 
one’s life. These capacities are achieved 
through functional capabilities of human 
agency, namely intentionality, fore-
thought, self-reactiveness, and self-reflecti-
veness. These capacities enable human 
being to self-regulate their behaviour. 
According to Vohs and Baumeister 
(2004), self-regulation is the capacity of 
individuals to guide themselves, in any 
way possible, toward important goal 
states. It refers to the executive and con-
trolling aspects of the self. Self-regulatory 
mechanisms determine how an individual 
actively attempts to construct and modify 
his or her own thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviour and also to influence and 
change the environment (Kunda, 1999). It 
refers to purposive behaviours in which 
the individual performs self-corrective 
adjustments when necessary, in order to 
stay on track for whatever purpose is 
under pursuit, for which the corrective 
adjustments originate from within the 
system (Carver, 2003). Thus a self-regula-
tory mechanism reflects regulation by the 
self, not just regulation of the self (Vohs & 
Baumeister, 2004), and reflects the proac-
tive qualities of mind (Caprara & Cervone, 
2000), or a voluntary action management 
(Karoly, 1993). It works through conscious 
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and unconscious processes. Thus, self-
regulation provides a framework on how 
the self is put together in behaviour in 
many contexts of human life. 
Many theories of self-regulation have 
been proposed. There are theories that 
specifically address the basic processes of 
self-regulation (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 
1981; Mischel & Ayduk, 2004; Cervone, 
2004), aspects of self-regulation processes 
(e.g., Banfield et al., 2004), developments 
of individual’s capacity for self-regulation 
(Vohs & Ciarocco, 2004), interpersonal 
components of self-regulation (Leary, 
2004), and individual differences in self-
regulation (Barkley, 2004). In applied 
settings, consequences of self-regulation 
have been studied quite extensively in 
areas such as addictive behaviour 
(Bechara, 2006; Sayette, 2006; Hull & Slone, 
2006) and consumer behaviour (Faber & 
Vohs, 2004). Albeit such diversities, there 
are two basic properties shared by all 
theories of self-regulation (Cameron & 
Leventhal, 2003). The first concerns the 
construal of self-regulation as a dynamic 
motivational system of setting goals, deve-
loping and enacting strategies to achieve 
those goals, appraising progress, and 
revising goals and strategies accordingly. 
The other property relates to the manage-
ment of emotional responses as crucial 
elements of the motivational system. 
The cybernetic control theory (Carver 
& Scheier, 1981; Scheier & Carver, 1988; 
Carver, 2004) provides a succinct expla-
nation of the dynamic motivational 
setting. The theory views individuals’ 
behaviours as a continuous process of 
movement toward (and sometimes away 
from) goals. The self-regulatory mecha-
nisms ensure that feedback loops are 
present in the continuous movement. A 
feedback loop consists of four components, 
namely input function, reference value 
(goals, standards), comparator, and output 
function (Carver, 2004). The process is 
analogous to the mechanism of a ther-
mostat: sensors detect the temperature of 
the room (input function), the comparator 
compares the measured temperature with 
the predetermined (goals, standard) 
desired temperature, the heating or cool-
ing mechanism is activated (output func-
tion). Figure 1. summarises the theory in 
the context of generic level of consumer 
behaviour. 
It is obvious that goals are primary 
components of self-regulatory mechan-
isms. Fisbach, Dhar and Zhang (2006) state 
that setting goals and monitoring progress 
towards goal achievement are fundamen-
tal to theories of self-regulation. Goals 
concerns any type of desired states that 
individuals possess, such as personal 
striving (Emmons, 1989), possible selves 
(Markus & Nurius, 1986), and self-guide 
(Higgins, 1996). Goals can be understood 
from its conceptual construction, i.e., 
structural properties, goal processes, and 
goal contents (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; 
Pervin, 1989; Kruglanski et al., 2002). The 
functions of goals are to energize and 
direct behaviour (Kruglanski et al., 2002). 
Besides, in the self-regulation mechanisms, 
goals serve as reference values in feedback 
loops.  
Toward this end, a self-regulation 
approach requires a generic goal system as 
a property of the consumer decision 
making at the generic allocation level. 
Built on the goal system theory 
(Kruglanski et al., 2002), a generic goal 
system consists of desired states that are 
relevant, and associative networks 
between goals. The associative networks 
between goals explain the hierarchical 
structure of goal systems (Kruglanski et 
al., 2002), and the means-end framework 
of goal-pursuit behaviour (K.G. Grunert & 
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S.C. Grunert, 1995). Based on Austin and 
Vancouver (1996), and Bagozzi, Bergami 
and Leone (2003), generic goals are inhe-
rent in the self-regulatory mechanisms of 
the consumer, and simply lying dormant 
until they are made salient by relevant 
stimuli. The self-regulatory mechanism in 
the context of generic decision making 
regarding a windfall income can be ex-
plained as follows. The presence of wind-
fall income enlightens the consumer on 
opportunities of achieving goals. The self-
regulation processes starts with the com-
parison between the characteristics of the 
windfall income, i.e., the size and the 
source (Henderson & Peterson, 1992), and 
the state of goals that become active. Deci-
sions regarding allocations of the money 
into generic-level budgets, i.e., spending 
and saving, follow from the comparison 
processes. The mental accounting 
processes of the decision making (Thaler, 
1980, 1985, 1999) implies that there are dif-
ferences in the marginal propensity to 
consume the same amount of incomes but 
of different characteristics of sources. Thus 
a self-regulation approach predicts differ-
ent behaviours of a windfall income as 
compared to the economic approach, and 
different explanations of the same types of 
behaviour as compared to the behavioural 
approach. In addition, the self-regulatory 
approach focuses on the explanation of 
processes, whereas the economic and be-
havioural approaches focus on the out-
come of behaviour. Generic goal systems 
constitute one of the psychological con-
structs in the self-regulation of consumer 
behaviour at the generic level. 
Way forward 
Our review so far favours the social 
cognitive approach to consumer behaviour 
at the generic level. Further, the preceding 
section concludes with a hypothetical 
generic goal system as a necessary psycho-
logical construct in consumer behaviours 
at this level. This hypothesis reflects a top-
down view, i.e., consumer behaviours that 
are goal-driven (e.g., Paulssen & Bagozzi, 
2005; Park & Smith, 1989; Bettman, Luce, & 
Payne, 1998), in contrast to the bottom-up 
view, i.e., consumer behaviours that are 
product-driven (e.g.,Johnson, 1984, 1988). 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no 
effort yet at examining what goals 
constitute a generic goal system, how these 
goals are organized, and how generic goal 
 Generic goals
Input function: value and 





Disturbance: the realization 








Figure 1. Schematic depiction of a feedback loop of a cybernetic control in a generic 
allocation situation of consumer behavior (adapted from Carver, 2004, p. 14). 
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systems explain differences in consumer 
behaviour at the generic level. Therefore 
this section attempts to higlight way 
forwards in consumer behaviour research 
with a focus on eliciting, constructing, and 
applying the generic goal systems in the 
explanation of consumer decision making. 
The specific research questions can be 
described as follow. 
What is the appropriate method and procedure 
for eliciting generic goals and its organiza-
tional properties? 
As discussed above, a generic goal 
system comprises multiple goal contents 
that are organized in certain ways. In 
addition, there might be individual diffe-
rences in the generic goal systems. Differ-
ences between individuals may be cha-
racterized in terms of different contents of 
the generic goal system, or it might be in 
terms of different organization of the same 
goal contents, or a combination of content 
and organization of the generic goal sys-
tem. Following on this rationale, a focus 
on eliciting the subject’s goals and how 
these goals are interrelated are more 
appropriate for the purposes of this study, 
rather than focusing on measuring how 
strongly the subjects are committed to 
certain goals. Whereas goal elicitation 
implies an idiographic approach, which is 
more suitable for taping into a subjective 
construct, such as consumer goal systems, 
measurements using psychological scales 
are more appropriate for testing a hypo-
thesis concerning a predetermined psy-
chological construct (Gravetter & Forzano, 
2006). 
Among the goal elicitation methods, 
the laddering technique has gained wide 
acceptance as a method that satisfies such 
a requirement. Other methods include 
projective techniques (McClelland, 1961; 
Malhotra & Peterson, 2006). Several varia-
tions in the laddering technique have been 
developed, such as the laddering tech-
nique for eliciting the means-end chain of 
consumer consumption (Reynolds & 
Gutman, 1988), for eliciting superordinate 
goals (Pieters, Baumgartner, & Allen, 1995; 
Bagozzi, Bergami, & Leone, 2003), and for 
eliciting personal values in organizational 
contexts (Bourne & Jenkins, 2005). How-
ever, these methods were designed for eli-
citing consumer goal systems at more spe-
cific levels. For example, the means-end 
chain model is concerned with goals in the 
context of choice between brands in a 
product category. On the other hand, the 
superordinate goal laddering procedure is 
concerned with specific focal goals that 
may signify choices between modal beha-
viours. A generic allocational context 
involves categories of consumer behaviour 
such as spending, saving, investing, and 
repaying debt. Empirical work on this area 
of study should attempts to answer is 
what specific aspects of the laddering pro-
cedure are required for eliciting generic 
goals and its organizational properties. 
What are the generic goals and how are they 
organized? 
By definition, a generic goal system 
includes all goals that become salient in a 
generic level of consumer decision mak-
ing. This may include goals as broad as 
maximizing utility as assumed in eco-
nomic theories. More specifically, goals of 
enjoying stable levels of consumption, as 
postulated in the life-cycle (Modigliani & 
Brumberg, 1954) and the permanent 
income theories (Friedman, 1957), are 
likely to be part of the generic goal sys-
tems. In addition, included in the generic 
goal systems are specific motives such as 
keeping with referent persons in terms of 
possessions and lifestyle, a phenomenon 
which is often addressed as the tendency 
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to keep up with the Jones’s (Duesenberry, 
1949; Schor, 2000). Different types of sav-
ing motives such as explained in Keynes 
(1936/1964), Browning and Lusardi (1996), 
and Katona (1975) also appear to fit in the 
generic goal system. Goals at the generic 
level may represent what consumers 
express as needs, wants, desires, motives, 
and values (e.g., Belk, Ger, & Askegaard, 
2000; Rokeach, 1973; Schiffman & Kanuk, 
2004; Maslow, 1954), especially with re-
gard to consumption motives. The prob-
lem studies on this area should attempt to 
address is, among others, how these goals 
are organized in the generic goal systems. 
Research demonstrates that individu-
als have to spend higher efforts when 
multiple goals are salient at the same time 
(Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998). The rela-
tionships between the salient goals can be 
characterized in terms of either substitu-
tive, complementary, or competing 
(Kruglanski et al., 2002). Higher cognitive-
motivational processing is required when 
multiple goals are incompatible to each 
other (Jain & Maheswaran, 2000). In this 
regard, saving and spending goals are 
naturally competing (Katona, 1975), since 
what is saved cannot be spent, and vice 
versa. Because the generic level of con-
sumer behaviour involves spending and 
saving goals (Van Veldhoven & 
Groenland, 1993; Antonides & Van Raaij, 
1998), and because goal organization faci-
litates individual functioning in the con-
text of the salience of multiple goals 
(Kruglanski et al., 2002), this study as-
sumes that goals at the generic level are 
structured in certain fashion. The problem 
that we should be focused on is how ge-
neric consumer goals are organized, what 
are the organizational properties, and to 
which degrees are generic goals indepen-
dent and interdependent of each other. 
What factors determine the formation of ge-
neric goal systems? 
Evidence of individual differences in 
consumer behaviour is paramount. Almost 
every handbook in consumer behaviour, 
e.g., Antonides and Van Raaij (1998), 
Assael (1992), Schiffman and Kanuk 
(2004), spent a chapter on the topic of 
individual differences. In the financial 
domain, Wärneryd (1999) describe consu-
mers of the same income levels, life-cycle 
stages, and demographic backgrounds as 
often different to each other with regards 
to their wealth and financial preparedness 
in retirement. Wealth and pensions are the 
direct results of retirement planning 
(Selnow, 2004), which involves decision 
makings at the generic level. Given that 
consumer decision making is goal-driven 
(Van Oesselaer, 2006), we should expect 
that individual differences in the wealth 
and pension levels are influenced by dif-
ferences in the generic goal systems. The 
question any research in this areas should 
like to answer is what are the psychologi-
cal and demographic factors that deter-
mine differences in the generic goal sys-
tems of individuals. 
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